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BOOK REVIEWS 
Euthanasia and Clinical Practice: 
Trends, Principles, and Alternatives 
The Report of a Working Party 
The Linacre Centre. London. 1984. viii & 88 pp .. Index. $9.50 (US). 
The Linacre Centre is a relatively new (founded in 1977) centre for research in health care 
ethics within the Catholic moral tradition. This book is the result of a collaborative effort of 
a working party made up of Linacre Centre staff. several of the best known English 
Catholic moralists. most notably. G. E. M. Anscombe and John Finnis. and several 
eminent clinicians with wide experience in dealing with the dying and seriously disabled. 
most notably. R. B. Zachary. The chair of the working party was John Mahoney. a well 
known Jesuit moralist. 
This book is concerned specifically with the lI1oralil,r of euthanasia and related activities; 
public policy questions are dealt with only incidentally. According to the Report. "there is 
eUlhanasia when the death of a human being is brought about on purpose as part of the 
medical care being given him" (p. 2). The crucial implication of this definition is that there is 
euthanasia only when death is sought to benefit the patient or. in the limiting case. when 
death is of benefit to others but no harm to the patient. The Report's conclusion is that 
euthanasia is wrong. But it has another. more constructive aim: to show how the traditional 
sanctity of life ethic actually provides intelligent and humane guidance for clinical practice 
and for the decisions of those facing death. 
The Report is a very competent piece of work. It is not only a noteworthy contribution to 
the discussion of the morality of euthanasia and withholding life-saving treatments. but 
also a realistic and clinically nuanced treatment which should prove to be of considerable 
help to working physicians and other health care professionals. Its utility is enhanced by the 
fact that it is brief. well written. and utterly without frills or rhetoric . The literature 
discussed is as much American as English. and it quickly becomes apparent that the 
differences between American and English society and health care are not relevant to the 
matters discussed. The analysis is occasionally difficult and sometimes nuanced. but 
philosophical technicalities are kept to a minimum. and the result is an accessible and 
highly practical book. It is available directly from the Linacre Centre: 60 Grove End Road. 
St. John's Wood. London NW8 9NH. 
EUlhanasia and Clinical Pra('lice is comprised of four major parts. The first provides a 
description and analysis of the various forces within clinical practice and thinking which 
are leading people to accept euthanasia. This part considers five specialized fields of care in 
which euthanasia has become a pressing issue: care of the newborn. care of the 
handicapped. terminal care, care of the elderly and intensive care. The conclusion is that in 
the care of the newborn. euthanasia has become commonplace. but that in the other areas 
there is little evidence of trends one way or another. except in terminal care. where the 
hospice movement indicates a trend against euthanasia. Unfortunately. the Report was 
completed before the practice of withholding artificially provided food and water from 
various debilitated patients was widely acknowledged and discussed. The implications of 
this growing practice are. therefore. not considered. 
The first part also considers factors external to clinical practice which have contributed 
to the acceptability of euthanasia: utilitarian conceptions of responsibility. possessive 
individualist conceptions of the person. social Darwinism. the organized advocacy of 
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euthanasia. and economic factors. 
The discussion of the program of Exit. the English group advocating voluntary 
euthanasia. exposes a central ambiguity in the case for voluntary euthanasia. Exit refrains 
from advocating non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. but neither does it reject them. 
In fact. Exit's arguments . all based on quality of life considerations and not on what a 
competent patient wants. justify non-voluntary and involuntary as well as voluntary 
euthanasia. The powerful rhetorical appeal to freedom and autonomy is exploited by this 
approach. yet Exit's arguments justify euthanasia because of its alleged benefits. and these 
benefits can be achieved as well or better in non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia than 
in voluntary euthanasia. This has implications for the relevance of euthanasia in the Nazi 
era: "But once it is grasped that central to the argument for euthanasia in Germany in the 
1920s was the concept of a "life not worth living' and how extendable that concept is (and 
how much it was extended) and when it is realized that exactly the same concept is being 
more or less explicitly invoked at the heart of present arguments for euthanasia. then the 
historical lessons of the German experience can hardly be overlooked. It takes some hubris 
to discount them" (p. 19) . 
The second part of the Report deals with the underlying moral and religious issues. It is 
comprised of a chapter on philosophical considerations about murder and the morality of 
euthanasia. and a chapter on the Christian tradition's teaching on the value of human life. 
The philosophical chapter is the most difficult in the Report . but it may well be the best 
short statement in existence of the Catholic view on the ethics of killing and withholding 
treatment. It will repay careful stud y. 
This chapter unfolds in logically rigorous manner. First. the concept of murder is 
clarified and the prohibition of murder is explained and defended . The core of the 
prohibition is the prohibition of intentionally killing the innocent. Second. euthanasia is 
related to this prohibition and shown not to be an exception to it. Killing human beings 
because their li ves are considered wretched or not worth living is not like killing animals in 
great distress. for it denies the special spiritual status of human beings. and is in a 
non-sectarian sense "irreligious." Third. the possibility of murder by omission is explained . 
Fourth. the difference betwee n murder by omission and certain other kinds ofwithholding 
life-sa\ing treatments arc demonstrated. In other words . this chapter clarifies both what 
euthanasia is and wh y it is wrong. and makes clear that not all decisions to withhold 
life-saying measures are murder by omission. 
The chapter on the Christian tradition amplifies and supports the philosophical analysis 
of the philosophical chapter. The ethical importance of human life as a gift from God, the 
character of human stewardship for life . and a Christian evaluation of the idea of "death 
wit h dignity" arc succinctly presentcd . along with relevant '1uotations from recent Catholic 
leaching. 
The third part of the Re port discusses more concretely the basis for decision-making 
concerning medical treatments. A chapter considers the rights and duties of competent 
pat ients in regard to medical treatments. In this chapter the meaning and logic of the 
distinction betwccn ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment is clearly presented 
and s hown to be essentially different from "passive" euthanasia. in which treatment is 
withheld not to avoid burdens. but to hasten death. Another chapter deals with the rights of 
incompetent paticnts and the duti es of others towards them. This chapter considers how the 
ordinary and extraordinary treatments distinction is to be properly applied to decisions 
about thc incompetent. 
Thc fourth part of thc Re port takes the principles and procedures developed in the 
second and third parts one step further towards concrete application. This is done by 
formulating a set of guidelines for good practice which are informed by the moral outlook 
de\'c!oped in th e earlier parts of the Report. Here the experience of the clinicians in the 
Working Part\' is pa rticularly evident. and the results of this experience are likely to prove 
especially helpful and encouraging to practitioners. For its two chapters make clear that 
opposition to euthanasia on sanctity of life is not only philosophically defensible, but 
practical and humane in a way that euthanasia is not. The first of the two chapters in this 
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part distinguishes the various classes of patients who would be considered by some as 
candidates for euthanasia, and details the kind of treatment appropriate for each. This 
chapter also spells out the requirements for good team care of the very debilitated and dying 
and shows how euthanasia can only compromise proper team care. The final chapter 
considers the specific measures needed to care for the patients in the threatened categories 
of people discussed in the first part of the Report. 
The Report ends with a succinct conclusion, a useful glossary of terms and a competent 
index. A brief but useful note on the Arthur case, an influential infanticide case decided in 
the mid-1980s, is added. 
The Report notes that the Linacre Centre is undertaking a new study on brain death. 
That is a welcome announcement. One hopes that the Centre will also take up a 
development in the euthanasia controversy which it does not address: namely, the growing 
practice of and concern about withholding artificially provided food and water from the 
comatose. Had that issue emerged clearly at the time the Report was written, its judgment 
that handicapped newborns were the group most at risk for the "benefits" of euthanasia 
might have been different. For now it appears that the permanently unconscious are at least 
equally at risk. Such is the dynamism of the movement towards euthanasia. Even so, this 
book is by no means outdated. Its arguments and analyses are not likely to become 
obsolete. For they state as well as I have seen stated, the core of the sanctity of life vision. 
Joseph Boyle 
SI. Michael's College 
University of Toronto 
For the Patient's Good: 
The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care 
Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma 
o.~ford Unil'ersity Press. o.~ford and Nell' York. 1988.256 pp. Hardcol 'er. $29.95 
In this book, Pellegrino and Thomasma continue their project of constructing a medical 
ethics based on a retrieval of beneficence, a project they began in their earlier work, A 
Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981). In the present volume, the authors leave the 
plane of a general philosophy of medicine, in order to elaborate an ethics of medical 
practice that will support ethically and medically sound clinical decisions, under 
contemporary circumstances. Their model , which they name beneficence-in-trust, is a 
conscious alternative to the quasi-hieratic paternalism of an earlier Hippocratic era: the 
contractarian patient-autonomy model which today enjoys widespread hegemony, and the 
teleology of social utility which now appears aggressively ascendant. 
The case this book makes for the option of grounding applied medical ethics in the good 
is persuasive, for many reasons. It provides a basis for continuity with the best in the 
Hippocratic tradition. It tends to supply a foundation for concrete ethical norms which 
comport with time-tested intuitions of what is right and wrong. As well, it dialectically 
elevates and integrates insights of the competing patient autonomy model, which are of 
undeniable value, and it is articulated within a meta-ethical framework making feasible its 
application under conditions of moral pluralism, by allowing for the interaction of 
differing conceptions of the good on those levels which can be distinguished from the 
minimum agreement necessary to ground the covenant between doctor and patient. Not 
least of aiL it offers a unified protocol for ethical decision-making under clinical conditions 
which appears fully informed by the responsible physician's regard for the sanctity of life, 
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